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The low salience of European integration for British voters
means that UKIP will have to expand their platform to gain
more support.
by Blog Admin
The rise of UKIP has heightened existing tensions within the Conservative party over the EU,
which the Prime Minister ’s promise of a future referendum has dampened without finally
resolving. However Ben Clements, Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker argue that the
available evidence shows that this is an issue of little importance to the majority of the
electorate. While UKIP have been moderately successful in drawing out connections between
the EU and issues of greater concern to voters, the persistently low salience of the European
question means that they will have to move beyond this core concern if they are to win more
votes.
European integration has long been a divisive issue in Brit ish polit ics, leading to dif f erences within and
between parties. Voters’ views on this tend to vary by party support but, in recent years at least, this
subject has been some way down the list of  issues that voters view as most salient. How do voters view
the issue at the moment and what ef f ect does this have on party competit ion?
From a party perspective, the rise of  the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has served to exacerbate tensions
among Conservatives over how f ar integration should go and whether the UK should remain a member of
the European Union (EU). While the Conservative Parliamentary Party has become more Eurosceptic over
time, as argued elsewhere, divisions remain between those f avouring withdrawal, those wishing to see
renegotiation of  membership to varying degrees, and those simply wanting integration to go no f urther
than the status quo. Michael Fabricant’s leaked paper on dealing with the UKIP threat suggests a high
degree of  concern among some Conservatives about competit ion between the two parties, especially given
Tory divisions on the issue. This may only have been heightened f ollowing UKIP’s second place in the
Eastleigh by-election. As Rob Ford argues though, any plans f or a blue-purple alliance would be ill-advised,
at least partly due to the diversity of  UKIP voters.
One way f or parties to deal with internal
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One way f or parties to deal with internal
dissent on the EU issue is to pledge a
ref erendum to be held some way of f  in the
f uture. This helps to shif t the conf lict out of
the parliamentary party and postpones a
potentially divisive discussion of  the issue.
Parties may gain f rom this if  they make the
pledge close to a European or general election
and if  the pledge quells dissent in the party –
or at least dampens it until some f uture point
– and wrong-f oots opponents. David
Cameron’s decision to promise a ref erendum
f ollowing an election and a renegotiation of
UK membership terms is consistent with this
approach. This is not a new tactic, though.
John Major used it in 1996 when committing to
a ref erendum if  the government recommended
joining the Euro, as did Labour when pledging
a ref erendum on the Constitutional Treaty
shortly bef ore the 2004 European elections,
and in 1975 with the ref erendum on the UK
remaining in the European Community.
Nevertheless, a risk, in Cameron’s case, is
riling the small proportion of  pro- integration
Tories.
However what are the public’s views on this
issue? Do they view it as salient? How do
attitudes vary by party support and what is the
ef f ect on competit ion between the
Conservatives and UKIP? Cameron’s speech
on Britain and the EU led to a spate of  polling
which, alongside longer running surveys, helps to tell us about where the public stand on these issues. The
Brit ish Election Study’s Continuous Monitoring Surveys (CMS), which involve monthly cross-sectional
surveys of  the Brit ish public, include a question which asks: ‘Overall, do you strongly approve, approve,
disapprove, or strongly disapprove of  Britain’s membership in the European Union?’. Combining responses
into ‘approve’ and ‘disapprove’ categories, Figure 1 shows trends over t ime f or the groups who have a
sense of  attachment to each of  the three major parties (Con, Lab and Lib Dem). Cameron’s view that the
UK’s current terms of  EU membership are problematic seems consistent with Conservative identif iers’
higher likelihood of  disapproving of  EU membership. These levels of  disapproval are much higher than
those among Labour and Lib Dem identif iers, and this dif f erence is sustained over t ime. In every survey
conducted between June 2005 and December 2012, a majority of  Conservative identif iers have  expressed
disapproval. The average level of  disapproval f or Conservative identif iers is 66 per cent. Conversely, the
average levels of  approval f or Labour and Lib Dem identif iers are, respectively, 64 per cent and 69 per cent.
We can look at the views of  party identif iers in more detail by dividing them up according to strength of
partisanship (very strong, f airly strong, or not very strong). Table 1 presents levels of  disapproval f or
identif iers of  each major party broken down by strength of  attachment. There is a clear pattern here: very
strong Conservative identif iers are most likely to disapprove of  EU membership, while Labour and Lib Dem
identif iers with a very strong sense of  attachment are most likely to approve of  Britain being part of  the EU.
Given recent developments on the European issue in domestic polit ics, we can also chart att itudes on the
specif ic issue of  voting in a ref erendum on Britain’s membership of  the EU. Using data compiled f rom
YouGov polls between 2010 and 2013, Figure 2 shows the proportions who would vote to withdraw f rom
the EU, broken down by vote intention. Again, Conservative supporters are much more likely to express a
pref erence f or withdrawal, compared to supporters of  the other main parties. However, views do f luctuate
over t ime, partly due to dif f erences f rom one sample to another but also suggesting that, to a degree,
public opinion may be malleable on this issue and responsive to developments at the party-polit ical level
and resulting media coverage.
What are the likely ef f ects of  this on party competit ion? One way of  assessing this is to look at how
voters view parties’ ability to deal with the EU issue. The Conservatives seemed to come out better than
others in most polls taken shortly af ter Cameron’s speech in January, although not by much of  a margin. A
Survation poll on 25 January 2013 showed 25 per cent of  respondents thought the Conservatives had the
best policy on Europe, f ollowed by 19 per cent f or Labour and 16 per cent f or UKIP. A Populous poll (23-24
January 2013) showed Cameron as the most trusted leader to renegotiate UK membership of  the EU with
36 per cent support compared to 18 per cent f or Ed Miliband and 10 per cent f or Nigel Farage. An Angus
Reid survey (24-25 January 2013) showed 22 per cent viewing Cameron as the leader most trusted on
Europe, a higher score than f or others, with Farage on 11 per cent. Given these polls were taken shortly
af ter Cameron’s speech we would need longer term data to assess how much they represent a temporary
boost f or Cameron or the Conservatives as the best leader or party at dealing with this issue. We can gain
some indication of  the ef f ect of  the speech on Conservative-UKIP competit ion via the Survation poll which
showed that 42 per cent of  2010 Conservative voters who had heard or read Cameron’s speech, agreed or
strongly agreed that it had made them less likely to vote UKIP. Around 21 per cent disagreed or strongly
disagreed with this statement. These f igures should be treated with some caution as they are based on
f airly small numbers of  respondents but they indicate the Conservatives may have some basis f or concern
about the possible leakage of  votes to UKIP.
Further bad news f or Conservatives is that among those who care passionately about the issue, the party
appears to have lost out sometime ago. According to the Brit ish Election Study’s (BES) post-campaign
surveys, at the 2005 general election, of  those seeing Britain’s relations with the EU as the most important
issue, 35 per cent thought UKIP was the best party to deal with this issue, with 30 per cent f avouring the
Conservatives. By 2010, of  those viewing Europe or the Euro as the most important issue, 61 per cent saw
UKIP as the party best able to deal with the issue while only 14 per cent f elt this about the Conservatives.
While UKIP seem to be in a much stronger posit ion than the Conservatives on this, the problem they f ace is
that the salience of  the issue among voters is very low. In the 2010 BES, a tiny 0.7 per cent of  Conservative
voters identif ied Europe or the Euro as the most important issue. Data f rom Ipsos-MORI show that in 2012,
only 6 per cent of  survey respondents thought that the EU or Europe was most important issue f acing
Britain. The EU did not even make the top ten issues among respondents questioned in February 2013,
despite Cameron’s speech.
Analysis of  open-ended responses to questions about the most important issue f acing the country on the
2010 BES surveys suggests salience may be a litt le higher than this because some voters explicit ly link the
EU to other issues such as immigration, particularly f rom central and eastern Europe, and the economy,
of ten with regard to the f inancial cost of  EU membership. Pointing to connections between EU membership
and other issues, such as immigration, is a technique UKIP have used to battle against the low salience of
European integration among voters. But raising the prof ile of  this issue is something UKIP will have to do
more of  if  they are to gain clear ownership of  this among voters more widely. Otherwise, UKIP will need to
continue expanding beyond their core issue if  they are to win more votes.
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